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The rising voter support for populist parties in Western Democracies in recent years 
has incited academic interest in populist voters and attitudes connected to the voting 
propensity of populist actors. In line of this research, numerous scales to measure populist 
attitudes among voters have been proposed. In most cases, however, the measurement of 
populist attitudes was tailored to specific countries and its applicability to cross-national 
research on populism was not assessed. This paper uses a cross-national survey to assess the 
measurement invariance, reliability, and validity of a deductively developed inventory for 
populist attitudes. The findings suggest that there is a common attitudinal base to left- and 
right-wing populism which may be measured reliably and invariantly across nations. 
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Measuring Populism across Nations: Testing for Measurement Invariance of an 
Inventory of Populist Attitudes. 
A populist Zeitgeist has enveloped much of Europe and the American continent, as 
evidenced by the electoral successes of populist parties over the past decade as well as 
populist causes such as Brexit (van Kessel, 2015; Mudde, 2004; Rooduijn, de Lange & van 
der Brug, 2014). Against this backdrop, scholars of political psychology are now asking to 
what extent the public has come to embrace populism and how this varies across nations (e.g., 
Rooduijn, 2017; van Hauwaert & van Kessel 2017). Since populism, in reality, does not occur 
as an abstract concept but is associated with quite different political actors across time and 
space (Taggart, 2000; Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017), the cross-cultural measurement 
of populist attitudes is non-trivial. In the past, many scales for the measurement of populist 
attitudes have been proposed (e.g., Akkerman, Mudde & Zaslove, 2014; Littvay & Castanho 
Silva, 2016; Oliver & Rahn, 2016; van Hauwaert & van Kessel 2017), most of which have 
been tailored to the political reality in single countries. Although some scales have been used 
in multinational designs, the degree to which measurements in different national contexts are 
comparable is yet undetermined. 
If scholars are to understand the international appeal of populism and the support for 
these movements, it is essential to develop measurement instruments that are deduced from a 
definition of populism which is applicable across time and space. Furthermore, to compare 
correlations of populist attitudes with other concepts across nations, measurement invariance 
has to be established (Davidov, 2009). Recently, Schulz and colleagues (2017) proposed a 
deductively developed inventory of populist attitudes (IPA) which is based on a minimal and 
consensual definition of populist ideology. However, the scale has only been tested in one 
country and the degree to which it exhibits cross-national measurement invariance is 
unknown. 
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In this study, we apply this IPA in a cross-national survey in eleven countries (i.e.: 
Austria, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States) to systematically test its measurement invariance 
using multi-group confirmatory factor analysis (MGCFA; Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 1998). 
In addition, we use correlational analyses with political orientations and voting intentions to 
assess its criterion validity. 
Review of measurement approaches to populist attitudes 
While the public understanding of the term ‘populist’ is strongly debated, a scientific 
consensus has been reached to the extent that there is a minimal definition of populism which 
is applicable to democracies across time and space (for an overview see van Kessel, 2015). 
This definition identifies populism as a thin-centered ideology that is composed of three core 
ideas. It sees society ultimately divided into a vicious elite and a homogeneous virtuous 
people and demands the power to be with the latter in order to ensure popular sovereignty 
(Taggart, 2000; Mudde, 2004). 
In reality, this thin populist ideology is enriched with left- or right-wing ideology, 
charismatic populist leaders, certain styles of communication, and concrete policy demands 
(Mudde, 2004). In addition, populist actors are often part of the financial and political elite 
themselves, and need to rhetorically solve the dilemma of being an anti-elitist high-ranking 
politician (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008). Also, populist actors do not always fight for 
direct democracy, but may choose to directly represent the will of the people which they 
claim to have internalized (Barr, 2009). Consequentially, populist actors differ strongly from 
each other, depending on their national context and orientation (Taggart, 2000). Nevertheless, 
they all share an ideological core which is expressed in the minimal definition. 
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Until recently, this definition of populism was mainly used to describe political actors 
and discourse (e.g. Ernst et al., 2017; Manucci & Weber, 2017). The core elements of its thin 
ideology may, however, also correspond with individual-level attitudes. People might hold 
that the political elite is corrupt and vicious, perceive the people to be a homogeneous and 
virtuous group, and favor the notion that this people should exercise full and unrestricted 
sovereignty. Populist attitudes thus represent a set of political ideas (Hawkins & Rovira 
Kaltwasser, 2017), that may be tapped with adequate survey questions. 
In an influential study on populist attitudes, Hawkins et al. (2012) used an extensive 
survey to identify possible items for a unidimensional scale to assess populist attitudes in the 
public. Their work was extended by Akkerman et al. (2014) who used the minimal definition 
of populism to refine the scale, selecting items representing the “sovereignty of the people, 
opposition to the elite, and the Manichean division between good and evil.” (Akkerman et al., 
2014: 1331). Others have sought to measure populism as a multi-dimensional concept and 
clearly distinguish it from other ideological measurements and making sure to specify 
different components of the concept separately (Stanley, 2011; Littvay & Castanho Silva, 
2016; Schulz et al. 2017). In some cases, these measurements have been extended with 
exclusionist (Hameleers et al., 2017) and right-wing-radical (Rooduijn, 2014) notions to better 
capture the political reality of current populist movements. 
Regardless of the measurement approach and underlying assumptions, most current 
scales agree with the minimal definition and include a Manichean perspective with anti-
establishment notion and a positive attitude toward the people, as well as a demand for more 
popular sovereignty. Populist attitudes measured with these instruments have been 
successfully linked to other political ideologies (Hawkins, Riding & Mudde, 2012), populist 
party preferences (Akkerman et al., 2014;), support for populist candidates (Rovira 
Kaltwasser & Hawkins, 2014), political issue stances (Hawkins et al., 2012; van Hauwaert & 
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van Kessel, 2017), media preferences and perceptions (Hameleers et al., 2017; Schulz, 2018; 
Schulz, Wirth & Müller, 2018), and a variety of dispositions (Spruyt, et al. 2016). 
Furthermore, the different measurements have been shown to discriminate populist attitudes 
from distinct concepts like elitism and pluralism (Akkerman, et al. 2014; Schulz et al. 2017). 
However, even if some scales are already used in cross-national surveys and comparative 
designs (van Hauwaert & van Kessel, 2017), there is yet no scale for measuring populist 
attitudes for which measurement invariance across nations is established. 
Cross-national scale for populism 
When developing a scale for cross-national research, it is important to ensure that the 
scale measures the same concept in each cultural context (Davidov, 2009). Specifically, the 
measurement must tap into the same concept in all cultural contexts and should be statistically 
invariant across nations. As a minimal requirement, this means that the correlational structure 
of the measurement is universal. Further, if the covariation with other concepts or the absolute 
values are to be compared, the scale should exhibit metric or scalar measurement invariance 
(Davidov, 2009). 
Therefore, in order to find a scale for populist attitudes, which is applicable in cross-
cultural research, it is preferable to follow an etic approach (Wirth & Kolb, 2012) in which 
the measurement is based on the consensual definition of populist ideology which is 
applicable across space and time (Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). A scale developed in 
this approach measures the core ideology of populism, which is common to all populist 
movements, and is thus likely to exhibit an invariant structure across countries. At the same 
time, this approach abstracts from the political reality of countries where populism may be 
closely associated to exclusionism, right-wing extremism, workforce empowerment, or other 
ideologies, as it focuses on the common ground of populist movements. 
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Considering measurement structure, different views regarding the dimensionality of 
populist attitudes have emerged. Most of the research to date applies a unidimensional 
conceptualization of populist attitudes (Akkerman et al., 2014; Rovira Kaltwasser & Hawkins, 
2014; Stavrakakis, et al., 2016, van Hauwaert & van Kessel, 2017). Only recently, scholars 
have begun to treat populism as a multidimensional construct (Littvay & Castanho Silva, 
2016; Hameleers, et al., 2017; Rooduijn, 2014). These scholars view populism as an 
attitudinal syndrome consisting of different elements, which together, form a single latent 
idea. The benefit of this approach is that it offers a detailed view of the different elements that 
comprise populist attitudes. In addition, it allows researchers to pin-point eventual cultural 
differences caused by the political reality in individual countries by comparing the 
correlations and relative difficulty of sub-dimensions. 
Recently, a promising multi-dimensional scale using an etic approach was presented 
by Schulz et al. (2017) which assesses respondents’ levels of anti-elitism, support for popular 
sovereignty, and perception of the people (see Table 1). The first two dimensions of this 
inventory of populist attitudes (IPA) refer to facets of the populist ideology that were already 
tapped in the seminal studies on populist attitudes (Hawkins et al., 2012, Akkerman et al., 
2014). The third dimension, comprising the perception of the people, was added to comply 
with the minimal definition of populism (Mudde, 2004). 
At the moment of writing, the IPA is the only deductive and multi-dimensional full 
scale for populist attitudes that accounts for all dimensions of the ideology and measures 
populist attitudes without referencing a particular ideology (other than the populist ideology) 
or policy positions. As such, it is independent of political realities and can be used to assess 
all sorts of populism, including left-, and right-wing populism. Additionally, the IPA was 
shown to be statistically distinct from elitist and pluralist attitudes (Schulz et al. 2017), which 
are the two main counterparts to populism (Mudde, 2004). 
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The IPA operationalizes populism as a second-order factor that drives three first-order 
factors, corresponding to the three sub-dimensions: anti-elitism, popular sovereignty, and the 
perception of a homogeneous and virtuous people. The first-order factors are reflected each in 
four indicators as illustrated in Table 1. It has been shown that the higher-order factor model 
outperforms unidimensional conceptualizations in terms of model fit (Schulz et al. 2017). 
Preceding work, however, only focuses on a single country (Switzerland). Although it was 
successfully applied to different countries, such as Germany (Schulz et al., 2015), France, and 
Great Britain (Müller et al. 2017; Wirz et al. 2018), its invariance was not explicitly assessed. 
In this paper, we take the IPA to a critical test by evaluating the reliability and validity of the 
scale in comparative research. 
Scale reliability 
The prime prerequisite for any scale is a reliable measurement. For instruments used in 
cross-national settings, this does not only mean that the scale should be reliable within each 
country, but that it should exhibit some degree of measurement invariance (Davidov, 2009; 
Jowell, 1998). If the configuration of the measurement model or the weight of its sub-
dimensions and items varies between countries, the scale may not be assumed to measure the 
same concept in each case and is unfit to be used in comparative designs. 
For multi-dimensional constructs, measurement invariance is conventionally tested 
using multi-group confirmatory factor analysis (MGCFA) which allows for the assessment of 
configural, metric, and scalar invariance (Davidov, 2009; Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 1998). 
In this approach, parallel CFAs are done in all countries with varying degrees of restrictions 
to test whether the measurement model is invariant to the country. The least demanding 
restriction is the configuration of the model. If the same correlational structure among the 
items and latent variables may be imposed on the data of all countries, configural invariance 
is established and the scale is reliable in each individual country. 
MEASURING POPULISM ACROSS NATIONS 8 
 
 
More demanding is metric invariance, which requires that the loadings of like items 
and factors are invariant across all groups. Metric invariance is a necessary condition for 
cross-national comparisons on correlations with other constructs. If researchers aim at 
comparing absolute values, scalar invariance is required. This means that measurement 
intercepts must be identical across countries. With scalar invariance, differences in the 
observed item means are directly proportional to differences in the latent means. 
Some researchers argue that partial invariance suffices (Byrne, Shavelson & Muthén, 
1989), meaning that only a subset of the items for each factor have to exhibit invariance in 
order to make cross-national comparisons. This lowers the hurdle somewhat, although ideally, 
the subset of invariant items should not be too small and that issues with invariance should be 
discussed when using the scale. 
Scale validity 
In addition to the reliability of a scale, it also has to be valid to be used as a 
measurement. This means that it should be composed of items which have the same meaning 
in all languages and cultural contexts and that it exhibits high criterion validity in that it 
should be correlated with related constructs. Here, the intention to vote for populist parties is 
undoubtedly the most proximal construct and has already been shown to be related to populist 
attitudes (van Hauwaert & van Kessel, 2017). A valid measurement for populism should 
correlate positively with voting propensity for populist parties and negatively with 
mainstream parties.  
In addition, the measurement should be linked to left-right ideology, even if the 
meaning of this concept itself varies cross-nationally (Piurko, Schwartz and Davidov, 2011). 
By now, it is well established that populism tends to attract citizens from both extremes of the 
political spectrum (Bakker, Rooduijn and Schumacher, 2016), although right-wing populism 
is more prominent in most Western European countries to date. We therefore expect to see an 
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overall curvilinear relationship between the IPA and left-right orientations with lowest values 
in the center. Depending on the political reality in each country, however, the strength of this 
curvilinear relationship may be more or less pronounced. 
Data and Methods 
Scale translation 
To ensure the validity of the instrument, we took great care in translating the items of 
the IPA to all languages in the survey. Translations are a key aspect of cross-national survey 
research and their quality influences all aspects of measurement, not least invariance 
(Harkness, Villar & Edwards, 2010). We used professional translators from the contracted 
survey institutes for a first translation into the eight interview languages. The resulting 
translations were checked by an invited panel of populism scholars from each country that 
were asked to re-translate the items and compare the wording of each item to the aspect of the 
minimal definition it was aimed to capture. This was to ensure that the translations were not 
only semantically sound but also preserved their relationships with the latent constructs 
(Davidov et al., 2014; Wirth & Kolb, 2012). 
Sample 
We administered the IPA in eleven countries. Using the United Nations classification 
scheme, our country sample includes two Eastern (Bulgaria and Poland), two Northern 
(Sweden and the U.K.), one Southern (Italy), and five Western European (Austria, France, 
Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland) countries, as well as the United States. Apart 
from being culturally diverse, the country sample also reflects variations in the success and 
nature of populist actors (Table 2). 
Populist parties were identified using the typologies of Van Kessel (2015), Mudde 
(2007), and Rooduijn et al. (2014). These authors also designate the ideological character of 
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populism. Note that we list no populist parties for the United States. Although the Tea Party 
can be considered a populist movement (Mead, 2011), it was part of a non-populist republican 
party in 2015. Also, the survey was done before Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders had 
started their populist campaigns for presidency. 
The populist vote shares in our sample vary from five (U.K.) to well over 50 percent 
(Italy) with left-right scores spanning from far left to far right. For some countries, populism 
is an exclusively right-wing phenomenon (e.g., Austria and France). In others, both left- and 
right wing populism can be observed (e.g., Germany and the Netherlands). In two countries, 
we observe strong genuine populist parties (Italy and Poland) without distinctive left-right 
orientation. Consequently, we believe that our country sample captures the wide variety of 
populism in Western democracies. 
Within each country, we conducted an online survey in a sample of 1’000 respondents 
(1’017 in Germany). Respondents were invited from existing online access panels using 
quotas for age, sex, and education. The samples are representative or for sex but fall short for 
age and education (see Online Appendix A). On the whole, our samples tended to be a bit 
older than the population median. The bias ranges from 7.2 months to five years. For 
education, the quota had to be relented in some countries due to low response rates of those 
with no or only primary education. This led to an overrepresentation for the groups with 
secondary or tertiary education. While the quotas for education were sufficiently realized in 
the Netherlands, the U.S., France and Germany, the samples of the remaining countries 
deviate from the population by 6 to 20 percent, each regarding different education categories. 
The survey was conducted in all eleven countries in March 2015. It took respondents 
an average of around 21 minutes (±5 minutes across countries) to complete the survey. 




Populism. The IPA operationalizes populism as a second-order factor which manifests 
in three dimensions. Each sub-dimension is tapped using four items. Based on the minimal 
definition of thin populist ideology, the dimensions are anti-elitism (e.g.: “MPs in Parliament 
very quickly lose touch with ordinary people.”), Homogeneity of the people (e.g.: “Ordinary 
people are of good and honest character.”) and popular sovereignty (e.g.: “The people, not the 
politicians, should make our most important policy decisions.”) (see Table 1). All items are 
measured on five-point rating scales (1 = “strongly disagree” to 5 = “strongly agree.”). 
Left-Right Orientation. Respondents were asked to position themselves on the left-
right spectrum on a single item: “In politics, people sometimes talk of ‘left’ and ‘right.’ 
Where would you place yourself on a scale ranging from ‘left’ to ‘right?’ ” The scale ranges 
from 1 = “left” to 11 = “right” (M = 6.03, SD = 2.60). 
Voting Intention. We asked respondents how likely they were to vote for six to ten 
parties in their own country: “There are a number of parties in [country] each of which would 
like to get your vote. How probable is it that you will ever vote for the following parties?” 
The list included the populist parties as indicated in Table 2, as well as all parties with a vote 
share above 4% in the last election. The response scale ranges from 1 = “not at all probable” 
to 5 = “very probable” (see Table 4 and Table 5 for means and standard deviations of voting 
intentions for populist and non-populist parties). 
Analysis 
Invariance 
We tested the measurement model (Figure 1) in an MGCFA with each country 
constituting a group. Following the recommendations by Steenkamp and Baumgartner (1998), 
we proceeded in three steps. First, we assessed whether the factor structure was identical 
across our eleven countries, followed by tests of restrictions on factor loadings (slopes) and 
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intercepts. This allows us to check for configural, metric, and scalar invariance, respectively. 
All estimations were done using the lavaan package in R (Rosseel, 2012). We used maximum 
likelihood estimation with Satorra-Bentler scaled test statistics, which are robust against 
violations of normality (Satorra & Bentler, 2001). 
While MGCFA is a useful tool for assessing measurement invariance, it is generally 
considered to be a conservative method (Davidov et al., 2015). Each restriction can reduce the 
model fit considerably, especially in datasets with large or unequal groups and unsystematic 
minor invariance problems (cf. Chen, 2007, p. 500). To minimize these problems, we rely on 
the recommendations of Chen (2007, p. 501). For large samples, as we have here, the 
recommendation is to compare the root mean squared error of approximation (RMSEA) and 
the comparative fit index (CFI) between restricted and unrestricted models. Any increase in 
the RMSEA above .015, in combination with a decrease in the CFI of .010, could indicate a 
lack of invariance. 
In addition to the invariance analyses, we assess the reliability of the IPA and its sub-
scales. We also regress the IPA score on the left-right orientation of the respondent as well as 
its square using a hierarchical linear model. This allows us to capture the hypothesized 
nonlinear relationship between the two variables overall and within each country. Finally, we 
correlate respondents’ IPA scores with their intentions of voting for populist and other parties. 
Results 
Measurement invariance 
Our first result provides support for the second-order factor model proposed by Schulz 
et al. (2017) when we pool all of the survey data. As can be seen in Figure 1, the sub-
dimension linked most strongly to the overarching populism factor is the demand for popular 
sovereignty, followed by anti-elitism, and then by the perceived homogeneity of the people. 
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The fit indices of the pooled data (CFI = .976; RMSEA = .048) are well within the 
limits proposed by Hu and Bentler (1999), to wit CFI ≥ .95 and RMSEA ≤ .08. The results 
also point toward a three-dimensional measurement model as the fit of a one-factor model is 
considerably worse (CFI = .645 and RMSEA = .184). 
When we perform MGCFA and impose configural invariance, the fit deteriorates 
slightly (CFI = .975; RMSEA = .050). Looking at the second-order factor model for the 
individual countries, we observe that it fits well in all countries, with CFI and RMSEA always 
meeting the Hu and Bentler (1999) limits. This is evidence that the structure of populist 
attitudes is the same across the countries and suggests cross-national consistency in the 
meaning of populism. 
Turning to metric invariance, we find strong evidence that the scale metric is identical 
across countries. When equality restrictions are imposed on factor loadings, the model fit is 
still satisfactory (CFI = .966; RMSEA = .053). Moreover, the reduction in CFI and increase in 
RMSEA relative to the configural invariance model are well within the limits proposed by 
Chen (2007). Taken together, the second-order factor model of IPA exhibits metric invariance 
across the countries under investigation. Thus, the structure and factor loadings are invariant 
and an interpretation of correlations of this scale with other (invariantly measured) concepts 
across countries is therefore admissible. 
The IPA items fare worse in terms of scalar invariance. Although the RMSEA of the 
scalar invariance model is still acceptable at .078, the CFI (.920) is insufficient. Additionally, 
the decrease in CFI relative to the metric invariance model is too high (-.046), while the 
increase in RMSEA (.025) also exceeds the Chen (2007) limits. 
The lack of invariance is mostly due to the homogeneity items, as is evident from 
score tests. Those tests indicate how much the model fit would increase should a particular 
restriction, in this case on the measurement intercepts, be removed. Further, Nye and 
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Drasgow (2011) suggest inspecting effect size indices to identify groups and items 
detrimental to measurement equality. Applying these methods, we identified one item (hom3) 
and one group (Sweden) that accounted for the bad fit of the scalar invariance model. 
Omitting Sweden and relaxing the constraint on hom3, the model fit increases to almost 
acceptable fit indices (CFI = .943; RMSEA = .066). 
While this does not fully resolve the problems with scalar invariance, a relaxation of 
all intercepts of the two items with the largest modification indices per factor (anti1 & 3; sov2 
& 4; hom1 & 3) resulted in an acceptable model fit (CFI = .960; RMSEA = .058) well within 
the limits defined by Chen (2007). We conclude that, albeit no complete scalar invariance was 
found, there is partial scalar invariance. 
Criterion Validity 
To test for criterion validity, we link the factor scores of IPA to left-right-orientation 
and voting intentions. In doing so, we reunite the invariant measurement with the unique 
political reality in each country. Not only are the parties, their positions, and their history 
specific to each country, we also have little reason to expect measurement invariance for the 
single-item measurement of self-disclosed left-right orientation. This means that country-
specific effects have to be considered when interpreting this validation. 
For left-right orientation, we expected people at the extremes of the ideological 
spectrum to exhibit stronger populist attitudes, resulting in a quadratic relationship. This is 
especially the case in countries where populist parties at both ends of the spectrum exist. In 
countries with only right- or left-wing populism, the pattern may be more linear as we expect 
the political reality to be in line with the attitudes of the public. To capture this variation, we 
estimate hierarchical regressions with and without quadratic term, using countries as the 
second level and respondents as the first. 
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As expected, the quadratic model (R2ad j = .0125; F(2,1648) = 68.05, Online Appendix 
B) fits the data better than the linear model (R2adj = .0062; F(1,10649) = 67.26), although 
right-wing populism is more prominent in the countries under investigation and citizens on 
the extreme right have higher IPA scores than those on the extreme left. Importantly, those in 
the middle of the left-right scale show lower populist attitudes compared to both extremes.  
When we compute country-specific intercepts that take into account the empirical 
Bayes residuals, three distinctive patterns emerge. In France, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom, we observe the curvilinear relationship. It is particularly 
pronounced in the United Kingdom, with the extreme left and right scoring about the same on 
the IPA. In Austria, Italy, Poland, Switzerland, and the United States, this u-shape 
relationship is not found. Here, we observe a monotonic increase in expected IPA scores as 
we move from the left to the right. In Bulgaria, there is also no evidence of a curvilinear 
relationship. However, here the expected IPA score decreases monotonically as we move 
from the left to the right of the political orientations scale. These differences reflect the party 
system in the respective countries (Table 2). 
 
In terms of voting intentions, we expected populist attitudes to be positively correlated 
with the intention to vote for populist parties and negatively with voting intentions for other 
parties. Table 4 shows the correlations between the IPA and vote intentions for populist 
parties. With few exceptions, we observe the correlations to be statistically significant and 
positive. The relation was found for parties on both ends of the political spectrum with 
support for the German Die Linke equally linked to populist attitudes as the French Front 
National. In some countries where several populist parties compete (Austria, Italy and Great 
Britain), however, not all voting preferences for populist parties were significantly associated 
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with populist attitudes. One atypical case is the negative correlation between the IPA and the 
intention to vote for GERB in Bulgaria. 
Table 5 shows that the IPA generally correlates significantly and negatively with vote 
intentions for non-populist parties. Only in one case is the sign reversed: voting for the 
Christian Democrats (CVP) in Switzerland. In all other cases of sign reversals, the 
correlations are not statistically significant. The results from the analyses of political 
orientations and vote intentions show that the IPA generally behaves as it should when 
confronted with the political realities of the countries under investigation, and exhibits 
criterion validity. The few exceptions will be discussed below.  
Conclusion 
In this study, we set out to systematically test the measurement invariance of populist 
attitudes in Western Democracies as measured in the three-dimensional and deductively 
derived inventory of populist attitudes (IPA, Schulz et al. 2017). By adhering to an etic 
perspective and guidelines offered for comparative research and measurement invariance 
(Davidov et al., 2014; Jowell, 1998; Byrne et al. 2009), we translated and tested the scale in 
eleven different countries, representing the five dominant cultures of Western Democracies. 
We found that the scale exhibits configural and metric invariance in all countries 
under investigation. Consequently, the scale can be applied as a reliable measure in 
comparative research and the correlations of the latent variables with other concepts can be 
compared between countries. Scalar invariance, which is a prerequisite for the comparison of 
mean scores across countries (Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 1998), was only partially achieved. 
We suspect that answers to the most problematic item for scalar invariance (hom 3: “Ordinary 
people share the same values and interests”) depends on the perceived pluralism within 
countries and may bias the measurement in some countries. Accordingly, comparisons of 
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mean values across countries should be done with reservation. We especially advise caution 
when applying the scale in Sweden as it reduced the model fit due to very low scores on the 
dimensions of popular sovereignty and homogeneity. Apart from these reservations, however, 
the results indicate that the scale reliably taps into the same three-dimensional concept of core 
populist attitudes in all countries. The three dimensions, thereby, are not genuinely populist in 
isolation, as individuals may be either critical toward the elite, proud of their people, or in 
favor of direct democracy without being populist. It is the common variance of these three 
dimensions, we consider a measurement for populism. 
 
To assess the external validity of the instrument, the measurement was analyzed in the 
context of the current political realities in the eleven countries by linking populist attitudes to 
self-reported left-right orientation and voting propensity. As expected, we found that populist 
attitudes were linked to both left- and right-wing political orientation. The curvilinear 
relationship between populism and orientation indicates that the IPA is suited to assess 
populism regardless of other political ideologies. In this study, the lowest values for populism 
were found for moderate left respondents, while there is a general tendency toward right-wing 
populism. This may be due to the selection of cases with many of the countries having strong 
right-wing populist parties but only few strong left-wing populist forces (see Table 2). 
A further indication for a valid measurement of populism lies in the correlation of 
populist ideology and voting intention. With few exceptions, individuals with stronger 
populist attitudes were more supportive for populist parties and less supportive for non-
populist parties. Only for three of the investigated 70 parties is this pattern contradicted.  
First, the GERB in Bulgaria is less supported by populist individuals in spite of this 
party having been identified as a populist movement by van Kessel (2015). A reason for this 
deviation may lie in the change this party has undergone since its founding in 2009 and has 
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become part of the political elite by the time of our survey in 2015. Second, the National 
Front for Salvation of Bulgaria (NFSB) received more support from voters with populist 
ideology in spite of not being commonly portrayed as a populist party. The reason for this 
relation may lie in the history of this young party which formed from a fraction of the populist 
Attack Party (PA) in 2011 and its voter base largely consists of former PA voters. Third, we 
found a positive correlation between populist ideology and support for the Christian 
Democratic Party (CVP) in Switzerland, although this party is not commonly considered 
populist. A possible reason for this finding is the shift in communication of the CVP in the 
early 2000s when it started using stronger populist language than any other party in political 
debates (Cranmer, 2011, p. 299) without adapting populist ideology in their party manifesto. 
This shift in self-presentation may have attracted voters with populist attitudes. 
In sum, the deviations from the expected relations between populist attitudes, voter 
support, and left-right-orientation are plausible and do not question the external validity of the 
IPA. It has to be noted, however, that the association of populist attitudes and voting 
propensity is generally weak to moderate. This is most likely due to the fact that the 
measurements tap into different concepts. The IPA measures a highly abstract general concept 
of populist attitudes which is invariant across space and time but hardly ever manifests in its 
pure form. Voting propensity, on the other hand, measures the support for actual political 
actors with clearly expressed positions on a multitude of issues, with (un-)likable leading 
candidates, and with their own histories of scandals and victories. Also, asking for voting 
propensities only makes sense if voters are used to reflecting their probability of voting for 
parties instead of candidates. It is, therefore, to be expected that populist attitudes only 
explain a fraction of the support for a real party. Even more so, the overall consistent pattern 
of an association between populist attitudes and voting propensity points toward a high 
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external validity of the IPA. The scale may therefore be considered to be an appropriate 
measurement of populist attitudes in the eleven countries under investigation. 
 
While this study is limited in its scope by the deliberate restriction on Western 
Democracies and the application to an online access panel, we consider it to be a first and 
important step in establishing cross-nationally valid measurement approaches to populist 
attitudes. Furthermore, as the scale is deduced from the minimal definition of thin populist 
ideology and translated from an etic perspective, we are confident that the scale measures the 
essence of populism, regardless of culture and current political situations and is applicable to 
other cultural contexts (e.g. southern American or Asian) as well. 
 
Future research may build on this work by adding adjunct attitudes, such as 
exclusionism or nationalism to capture current right-wing populist ideology and align the 
measurement with the political reality in specific countries. Also, since measurement 
invariance has been successfully established, future research may use this scale for more in-
depth analyses of cross-cultural differences in populist reality. We do not propose that this 
scale is the single and best solution to measure populism, but propose it as a valid option 
cross-national populism research. 
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